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Abstract 
This paper uses survey evidence to estimate the compliance cost of the U.S. system of taxing foreign-source in- 
come. The evidence suggests that this cost is about 40 percent of  the total tax-compliance cost of  large U.S. cor- 
porations, which is disproportionately higher than the aggregate share of assets, sales, and employment that is 
abroad. It is also very high compared to the revenue raised by the United States from taxing foreign-source income, 
although this comparison must be qualified because arguably a principal purpose of this system is to protect U.S. 
revenues collected on domestic-source income. The disproportionate compliance cost of foreign-source income 
is not apparent in a survey of European-based multinational corporations. 
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There is ample anecdotal evidence that the United States' system of taxing the foreign- 
source income of its resident multinationals is extraordinarily complex, causing the compa- 
nies considerable cost to comply with the system, complicating long-range planning deci- 
sions, reducing the accuracy of the information transmitted to the Internal Revenue Service 
ORS), and even endangering the competitive position of U.S.-based multinational enterprises. 
This paper uses data from three recent surveys of multinational enterprises to assess quan- 
titatively these claims. Specifically, its goals are threefold: to estimate the magnitude of 
the cost of complying with the U.S. system of taxing foreign-source income, to investigate 
the determinants of these costs, including both aspects of the firm's operations and aspects 
of the tax system and, finally, to discuss the policy implications of the findings. 
1. Total tax compliance costs of big business 
Before focusing on the tax-compliance costs due to foreign-source income, we begin by 
summarizing what is known about the overall tax-compliance costs of big business? The 
most comprehensive study of this topic was carried out by these authors as part of a project 
of the Office of Tax Policy Research (OTPR) of the University of Michigan Business School, 
based on a 12-page survey sent to the tax officers of the 1,672 firms in the Coordinated 
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Examination Program (CEP) of the Internal Revenue Service. Firms are selected into the 
CEP on the basis of several criteria, of which size and the expected resource cost of an 
examination are primary; 58 percent of the CEP firms have assets in excess of $1 billion. 
For most of the CEP firms, the IRS conducts a team examination of the tax return each 
year. 2 Because the CEP includes firms with unresolved past filings, regardless of their cur- 
rent business status, a number of these firms were not active entities in 1992. From the 
1,329 firms that were active, we received 365 completed surveys, for a response rate of 
27.5 percent. 3 
The survey instrument, which was drafted with the assistance of a panel of corporate 
tax officers, had five parts.* General characteristics of a company's tax affairs, its industry 
or sector, measures of firm size, and the extent of its foreign operations were explored 
in Part 1. Parts 2 and 3 concerned the costs of complying with the income tax laws. Respon- 
dents were asked to apportion these costs along several dimensions: whether due to federal 
or to state income t~xation, whether due to personnel or nonpersonnel expenditures, whether 
personnel expenditures were for salaries inside the firm's tax department, for salaries in 
other departments, or for fees to outside advisers, and whether expenditures were for record 
keeping, research, or one of eight other functions. The fourth part examined the firm's 
interactions with the Internal Revenue Service, and the final part posed open-ended ques- 
tions about the sources of complexity in the tax code, suggestions for simplifying it, and 
the strategies adopted in order to deal with greater complexity. 
Table 1 presents the estimated compliance cost of both the entire CEP sample and a 
weighted subsample of the respondents constructed to represent the Fortune 5007 The esti- 
Table L Average compliance cost (in thousands of dollars). 
a. All Responding Firms 
Federal State and Local 
Tax Other Tax Other 
Function Department Departments Department Departments Total 
Within-firm personnel $476.8 $130.6 $217.8 $70.3 
Within-firm nonpersonnel 163.9 123.2 76.6 58.5 
Outside firm 190.1 57.3 
Total $1,084.6 $480.5 
b. Fortune 500 Only 





Tax Other Tax Other 
Function Department Departments Department Departments Total 
Within-firm personnel $615.3 $160.0 $291.3 $82.0 $1,149.5 
Within-firm nonpersonnel 236.0 183.8 103.8 94.6 618.2 
Outside firm 269.7 73.0 342.7 
Total $1,465.7 $644.7 $2,110.4 
Source: Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993). 
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mated average annual cost for a CEP firm was $1.57 million, totaling $2.080 billion for all 
1,329 firms. ~ In the weighted Fortune 500 subsample, each firm spent an average of $2.11 
million complying with federal and subfederal income taxes. Aggregating to all Fortune 500 
firms, this corresponds to a total compliance cost of $1.055 billion. For both samples and 
in round numbers, 70 percent of.this total was due to federal income tax, with the remainder 
due to state and local income taxes. Fifty-five percent of the expenditures are devoted to 
within-firm personnel, while 30 percent are spent on nonpersonnel purchases and 15 per- 
cent go to outside advisers. Considering only the within-firm expenditures, 70 percent are 
incurred inside the tax department, the remainder in other, nontax departments. 
An alternative way of describing the magnitude of compliance costs is to compare them 
to the revenues raised. The most recent data available for the 1989 CEP firms, indicates 
a total federal income tax liability of $54.4 billion. Since our estimate of federal income 
tax compliance costs for CEP firms is $1.440 billion (approximately 70 percent of $2.080 
billion), the cost-to-revenue ratio, neglecting the timing disparity, is 2.6 percent. A similar 
calculation, for state income taxes, shows that compliance costs account for a somewhat 
higher 5.6 percent of the revenues raised. Over all levels of government, our cost-to-revenue 
ratio estimate is 3.2 percent. This is lower than the cost-to-revenue ratio of 5 to 7 percent 
that has been estimated for the individual income tax (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; Blumenthal 
and Slemrod, 1992). 
In order to explore the functional distribution of compliance costs, the survey defines 
ten categories of activities that absorb the efforts of firm personnel: record keeping, research, 
planning, dealing with others, filing the return, audits, appeals, litigation, preparing infor- 
mation for financial statements and monitoring the tax process. The breakdown of costs 
into these areas is presented in Table 2. For employees working within a firm's tax depart- 
ment, filing returns commands the largest share of compliance costs, about 30 percent. 
Audits, planning, and research each contribute an additional 10 percent and record keeping 
adds just under 10 percent. Costs that are attributed to the work of employees in other 
departments (within the firm) are heavily accounted for by record keeping (about 50 per- 
cent). Another 15 percent of these costs go toward preparing information for financial state- 
ments. Most of these large firms also hire outside consultants for tax matters. About 80 
percent of external advising expenditures are devoted to five functions: planning, litigation, 
research, appeals, and audits. Looking at this in a slightly different way, more than half 
of all of the tax litigation and appeals work is done externally. These findings suggest a 
strong division of labor in compliance activities: tax department personnel specialize in 
filing returns, while personnel in other departments do the record keeping, and outside 
consultants concentrate on litigation and planning. 
Regarding the factors determining compliance cost, our analysis suggests that firm size 
plays an important role. While larger firms (measured by assets, sales, or employment) 
experience larger compliance costs, there are clear economies of scale since the average 
cost per unit of size decreases as size increases. Primary industry or sector also matters. 
Our results suggest that costs are higher for firms engaged in mining and in oil and gas 
exploration and production; they seem to be lower for firms in wholesale and retail trade. 
Several other characteristics appear to contribute significantly to higher compliance costs. 
These include the existence of multiple active entities, being subject to the alternative mini- 
mum tax or California income tax, and the presence of ongoing appeals or litigation. 
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Table 2. Average functional expenditures by location of activity. 
a. All Responding Finns 
Within the Firm 
Tax Other Outside 
Function Department Departments Assistance Total 
Percentage of 
Total Costs 
Record keeping $69.5 $115.7 $4.2 $189.4 
Research 75.4 8.3 42.7 126.4 
Planning 88.1 12.6 49.6 150.3 
Dealing with other personnel 52.8 14.7 8.4 75.9 
Filing returns 215.1 20.1 17.7 252.9 
Audits 89.5 17.3 29.7 136.5 
Appeals 25.4 3.7 30.8 59.9 
Litigation 14.0 2.0 48.0 64.0 
Preparing information for 
financial statements 41.2 32.8 6.0 80.0 
Monitoring tax process 36.1 7.5 6.0 49.6 
Other 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.8 
Total $707.0 $234.6 $246.8 $1,188.7 
b. Fortune 500 Only 













Tax Other Outside 
Function Department Departments Assistance Total 
Percentage of 
Total Costs 
Record keeping $78.8 $136.1 $1.4 $216.3 
Research 101.8 11.8 64.6 178.2 
Planning 124.3 17.3 84.0 225.6 
Dealing with other personnel 64.9 25.1 10.7 100.7 
Filing returns 283.8 37.2 17.1 338.1 
Audits 121.0 29.1 31.4 181.5 
Appeals 32.0 4.5 35.7 72.2 
Litigation 19.6 2.8 69.4 91.8 
Preparing information for 
financial statements 48.8 38.6 7.5 94.9 
Monitoring tax process 51.3 11.2 12.1 74.6 
Other 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.0 













Source: Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993). 
Note: These figures do not include within-fn'm nonpersonnel costs. All figures, 
are in thousands of dollars. 
except for those in the last column 
2. The compliance cost of doing business abroad 
In addit ion to assessing the magni tude  and determinants  of  overal l  compl iance  costs, the 
O T P R  survey included a quest ion focusing on the fraction of  the costs associated with their 
operat ions that generate fore ign-source  income.  Respondents were  asked,  " W h a t  fract ion 
o f  the total compl iance  cost  due to the  federal corpora te  i ncome  tax were  due to foreign- 
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source income? ''7 From the responses to this question, we calculate that 39.2 percent of 
the total compliance cost of federal taxes is due to foreign-source income s (43.7 percent 
for the Fortune 500 sample). 
Are these percentages disproportionately high relative to the companies' foreign activities? 
The simple answer to that question is yes, based on a comparison of 39.2 percent to the 
fraction of either assets abroad (21.1 percent), sales abroad (24.1 percent), or employment 
abroad (17.7 percent). For the Fortune 500 companies, 43.7 percent is higher than the 
fractions of assets, sales, and employment abroad, which are 27.8, 30.1, and 26.2 percent, 
respectively? 
Another estimate of the importance of foreign-source operations for compliance costs 
comes from a 1993 survey of the twenty-four companies in the International Tax Policy 
Forum flTPF); of the twenty-four members, seventeen responded to the survey. The respon- 
dents consist of some of the largest multinationals in the United States, with average world- 
wide assets in 1991 of $74.2 billion. These companies' estimated average annual compli- 
ance cost with the federal and state corporation income tax systems came to $13.04 million. 
The average costs due to foreign operations came to $4.66 million. Assuming that 70 per- 
cent of the total compliance cost (equal to $9.13 million) was due to the federal system, 
51.0 percent of these costs were due to foreign-source income; this figure is quite close 
to the 45.5 percent figure obtained from the OTPR survey's Fortune 500 sample. These 
companies report that the average tax due on foreign-source income, net of foreign tax 
credits, was $55.14 million, so that compliance cost represented 8.5 percent of net revenue. 
This number is significantly higher than the ratio for compliance costs as a whole deter- 
mined from the OTPR survey. 
Some more insight into the relationship between compliance costs and foreign presence 
can be gained from examining Figures 1 through 3. These scatterplots show, for firms from 
the OTPR survey with a foreign presence, the fraction of federal compliance cost due to 
foreign-source income (percent foreign compliance costs) (PFC) against the three measures 
of foreign presence discussed above--percent foreign assets (PFA), percent foreign sales 
(PFS), and percent foreign employment (PFE), respectively. Inspection of these figures 
reveals that significantly more observations lie above the diagonal than lie below it, which 
is consistent with the claim that foreign-source operations are associated with a higher com- 
pliance cost than their relative importance would suggest. 
How foreign-source income contributes to compliance cost can be explored more closely 
by estimating the curve that best fits these data. For the data in each of the three figures 
we estimate the best-fitting cubic relationship ~~ that goes through the two endpoints of the 
diagonal; these estimated relationships are shown in the figures. In all cases the best-fitting 
curve starts out above the diagonal but then crosses it at a fraction of foreign presence 
of about 40 percent. This pattern is consistent with there being significant fixed costs for 
foreign operations, so that when foreign operations make up considerably less than half 
of the company's operations, they account for a disproportionate cost of the tax operation. 
Once the firm is a truly global operation, economies of scale in dealing with foreign tax 
matters are achieved. 
There are two reasons not to be satisfied with this analysis. First of all, it relies on the 
answer to one question (about the fraction of costs due to foreign-source income), the an- 
swer to which is enormously complex and subtle. The answers provided are thus more 
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Figure 1. Compliance costs and foreign assets. 
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Figure 2. Compliance costs and foreign sales. 
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Figure 3. Compliance costs and foreign employment. 
impressionistic than most of the other answers to the survey and therefore subject to more 
error. The second reason is a purely statistical one. To the extent that there are errors in 
the answer to this question, there is good reason to suspect that they are not purely white- 
noise errors that would not affect the estimated best-fitting curve. When the true answer 
is a low percentage of compliance costs (say, 10 percent), there is much more scope for 
an error on the high side than for an error on the low side; where the answer is a high 
percentage of compliance costs (say, 90 percent), there is much more scope for an error 
on the low side than on the high side, where the answer is bounded by 100 percent. This 
will produce bias in the estimated relationship. 
Both of these problems are avoided by an analysis of the relationship between total com- 
pliance costs, worldwide size, and the fraction of operations abroad. If, holding worldwide 
size constant, more globally oriented finns have higher compliance costs, this suggests 
that the compliance costs of foreign operations is higher than that of domestic operations. 
Table 3 displays the results of three multiple regression analyses of (the logarithm of) total 
compliance costs as a linear function of (the logarithm of) each of three measures of global 
size as well as the three measures of foreign presence. 
In each of the three cases the estimated coefficient on the foreign-presence ratio is posi- 
tive and statistically significant, suggesting again that the compliance costs of foreign oper- 
ations are higher than that of domestic operations. For example, the interpretation of the 
coefficient on the ratio of total employment that is abroad, 0.0065, is as follows: for a 
firm of given worldwide size, as measured by total employment, shifting employment abroad 
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Table 3. Results of regression analyses of the relationship between total compliance 
costs, size, and the extent of foreign activity. 
Indicator of World 
Size and Percentage (1) (2) (3) 
Foreign Assets Sa les  Employment 
Independent Variables: 
Intercept 2.32 2.78 5.65 
(0.32) (0.39) (0.11) 
Worldwide size 0.568 0.502 0.410 
(0.045) (0.054) (0.049) 
Percentage foreign 0.0120 0.0098 0.0065 
(0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
R 2 0.630 0.496 0.366 
Number of observations 125 123 158 
Mean of dependent variable 6.591 6.597 6.530 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of internal personnel costs plus expen- 
ditures on outside assistance. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. In column (1), worldwide assets is measured by the logarithm of worldwide 
assets, and percentage foreign is measured by the ratio of foreign assets to worldwide 
assets. Similar definitions apply to columns (2) and (3). Analyses of columns (1) and 
(2) exclude financial and insurance firms. 
to raise the foreign ratio by ten percentage points will increase total compliance costs by 
6.5 percent. 
These two different analytical approaches suggest that the compliance costs of foreign- 
source operations are disproportionately high compared to either the foreign share of assets, 
sales, or employment--that is, holding size constant, costs are higher with greater foreign 
presence. It would also be of interest to know whether the compliance costs are dispropor- 
tionately high compared to foreign-source income, but that information is not available 
from either survey. 
Perhaps of  most interest is the ratio of foreign-income-related compliance costs to the 
revenue raised by the U.S. Treasury from foreign-source income. Because most of the tax 
otherwise due to the U.S. Treasury on foreign-source income is offset by foreign tax credits, 
the net tax paid to the U.S. government is small relative to foreign-source income. Recall 
that in the survey of ITPF firms, the cost-to-revenue ratio for foreign-source income was 
8.5 percent. This contrasts with the OTPR survey result, for all CEP firms, that the federal 
cost-to-revenue ratio, for both domestic and foreign income, was 2.6 percent. Indeed, recent 
work by Grubert and Mutti (1995) suggests that the compliance cost-to-revenue ratio for 
foreign-source income may be even higher than 8.5 percent; their results indicate that, 
although total foreign-source income in 1990 was $89.7 billion, the net tax paid to the 
U.S. government on that income was only $4.6 billion. This implies that the ratio of  aggre- 
gate compliance cost to aggregate net revenue raised is very high. 
This conclusion must be interpreted very cautiously, however, because arguably the ob- 
jective of our foreign-source income provisions is to protect the revenue appropriately levied 
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on domestic-source income. The argument is that, in the absence of a strict (and perhaps 
inevitably somewhat complex) regime for limiting foreign tax credits, multinational com- 
panies could offset domestic-source income with foreign tax credits. Even in a territorial 
system, under which foreign-source income is exempt from U.S. taxation, rules about the 
sourcing of income would have to be enforced in order to defend the U.S. revenue base. 
This suggests that it would be appropriate to compare the compliance costs of foreign opera- 
tions not to the net revenue directly attributable to these operations, but rather to the net 
revenue (on both domestic-source and foreign-source income) that would be foregone if 
a radically simpler system were to be instituted. We discuss this issue in Section 6. 
3. What characteristics of foreign business operations contribute to compliance costs? 
In this section we use multiple regression analysis to search for the particular characteristics 
of foreign business operations that contribute to compliance costs, holding constant other 
determinants of cost such as principal sector, the scale of operations, and domestic tax 
characteristics. The results may be found in Table 4, where the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of foreign compliance costs. Of the characteristics studied, only the number of 
Table 4. Results of regression analysis of what characteristics of foreign business operations contribute to foreign 
compliance costs. 
Independent Variables Estimated Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 8.3114 0.8335 
Foreign assets -0.0712 0.1656 
Foreign employment -0 .1390 0.1653 
Foreign sales 0.8305 0.2256 
Industry: mineral 1.6242 0.8596 
Industry: trade -0.9758 0.7505 
Number of majority-owned foreign subsidiaries 0.0100 0.0056 
Number of countries in which a subsidiary is located -0.0039 0.0125 
Number of branches -0.0881 0.0699 
Number of countries in which a branch is located 0.0670 0.0862 
Foreign sales corporation 0.1363 0.3334 
Section 936 corporation 0.0744 0.3855 
Foreign joint venture -0.0023 0.0039 
Foreign parent 0.2566 0.5686 
R 2 0.6932 
Note: n = 64. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of foreign compliance cost (expenditures on salaries within the firm and on 
outside tax consultants, multiplied by the percentage of compliance costs attributed to foreign-source income). 
Foreign assets, foreign employment, and foreign sales are defined as logarithms. 
Industry: mineral is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm is engaged in mining or oil and gas and 0 otherwise. 
Industry: trade is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm is engaged in either wholesale or retail trade and 
0 otherwise. 
Foreign sales corporation is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm has one and 0 otherwise. 
Section 936 corporation is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm has one and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign joint venture is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm is engaged in one and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign parent is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the fLrm has a foreign parent, and 0 otherwise. 
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majority-owned subsidiaries had a statistically significant effect (at a 90 percent confidence 
level); each additional subsidiary is associated with a 1 percent increase in the compliance 
costs of foreign-source income. 
4. What features of the U.S. Tax Code contribute to the compliance costs of foreign 
operations? 
The previous section addressed what characteristics of foreign business operation contribute 
to compliance cost. In this section we address what features of  the U.S. Tax Code contrib- 
ute to compliance cost. These are, of  course, related questions because a possible reason 
that a particular characteristic of  business operations adds to compliance cost is the way 
the tax system is structured. 
This important question cannot be answered quantitatively with the OTPR survey results, 
however, because all of  the firms face the same statutes. Because there is no variation in 
the applicable tax law statutes across companies, there is no way to assess the compliance- 
cost impact of  altering certain statutes. This would require an analysis of  compliance cost 
over time as tax law changed. 
In the absence of quantitative measures of  the cost of  particular aspects of  the tax code, 
we must be content with the qualitative response to questions about tax complexity. One 
of the OTPR survey questions asked, "What aspect(s) of the current tax code is/are most 
responsible for the cost of  complying with the federal corporate income tax code?" Inter- 
national issues were widely cited. Ninety-three respondents mentioned at least one foreign- 
related area, while 212 had either a minority or majority interest in a foreign affiliate or 
had a foreign branch. Of  the ninety-three, forty-four merely mentioned "international" or 
"foreign" as the tax code aspect causing complexity, without citing a specific section code. 
Table 5 provides a breakdown of the most commonly mentioned code sections that were 
identified. The foreign tax credit heads the list with thirty-seven mentions, including nine 
who singled out the requirement that income sources be segregated into "baskets"  for which 
distinct foreign tax credit calculations must be made. Information reporting on foreign- 
controlled corporations on Form 5471 came second, with twenty-one limitations, followed 
by the rules governing the sourcing of  income (seventeen), and transfer pricing issues in 
Section 482 (sixteen). 
Table 5. Most cited areas of complexity in taxing foreign-source income. 
Rank Tax Aspect Number of Mentions 
1 Foreign tax credit 37 
2 Information reporting on controlled foreign corporations (Form 5471) 21 
3 Determination of source of income (Sections 861 through 865) 17 
4 Transfer pricing (Section 482) 16 
5 (tie) Subpart F 5 
5 (tie) Form 5472 5 
7 (tie) Foreign sales corporation requirements 4 
7 (tie) Foreign ownership provisions (Section 6038A) 4 
Source: OTPR Survey. 
Note: Other tax code aspects mentioned: branch profits tax, look-through rules, PFIC rules, foreign currency 
rules (Section 986), possessions corporation credit (Section 936). 
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5. Do high compliance costs put U.S. multinational enterprises at a comparative 
disadvantage with foreign multinationals? 
Conventional wisdom holds that not only is the U.S business tax system very complex but 
also that it is more complex than the systems imposed by other countries. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to quantitatively assess the conventional wisdom because comparable studies 
of the tax-compliance costs of big business for other countries do not exist. Although there 
have been excellent studies of the business tax-compliance cost in other countries, none 
of these studies has focused on the largest companies, making a meaningful cross-country 
comparison impossible. For example, the business sample in the United Kingdom used 
by Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989) contained only two companies with more than 
500 employees and only six with more than 100 employees. In their study of Australia, 
Pope, Fayle, and Chen (1991) report having sixty-seven firms with over 1,000 employees, 
and seventy-seven with annual turnover (sales) exceeding $100 million. For the latter group.of 
companies they estimate annual mean compliance costs to be A$56,896, compared to mean 
tax payable of A$1,760,000; this amounts to 3.2 percent of tax revenue. Any comparison 
of these numbers to the U.S. case should note the much smaller average size of the Austra- 
lian sample. 
There is one informative recent study of note, however. This study was commissioned 
by the committee of experts formed by the European Commission (EC) in 1990 to investi- 
gate whether the commission should institute proposals to harmonize corporation taxes 
within the EC. One of the questions posed to this committee, known informally as the 
Ruding Committee after its chairman Onno Ruding, was to what extent differences in busi- 
ness taxation cause major distortions with respect to investment decisions and competition. 
To help answer this question, the committee commissioned a survey of businesses in 
all the European Community and five European Free Trade Association countries; 965 
responses were received, representing a response rate of just over 11 percent. The median 
turnover of the responding companies was s million for all companies, and s 
million for those identified as parent companies of multinational groups. Slightly more 
than two-thirds of the respondents were in the industrial sector, with the remainder split 
among retail, financial services, nonfinancial services, and other. 
One section of the survey dealt with the compliance and tax-planning costs associated 
with international taxation as opposed to domestic taxation. The respondents were asked, 
separately for domestic income and foreign-source income, to estimate tax compliance costs 
as a percentage of the actual income flows. The distribution of responses is displayed in 
Table 6. It is clear that for most companies compliance costs represent a small fraction 
of both domestic- source and foreign-source income. More than 85 percent of respondents 
estimate the cost to represent less than 3 percent of either source of income. More signifi- 
cantly, there is no evidence that the compliance-cost ratio is higher for foreign-source com- 
pared to domestic income. Almost exactly the same percentage of firms put the costs less 
than 1 percent in both cases; 85.2 percent of the respondents assess the cost to be less 
than 3 percent for foreign-source income, compared to 87.1 percent for domestic-source 
income. Our estimates of the average-compliance-cost-to-income ratio for all respondents 
are also very similar--1.69 percent for foreign-source income compared to 1.74 percent 
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data from the Ruding Committee survey suggests that, for foreign multinationals, compli- 
ance costs relative to income are no higher for foreign operations than they are for domes- 
tic operations. 
We can also use the Ruding Committee survey responses to do a very broad comparison 
of the compliance cost relative to income of U.S. versus European multinationals. The OTPR 
survey estimated the total compliance cost to be 3.2 percent of taxes paid. Using a combined 
federal and state corporate tax rate of 41 percent implies that the ratio of cost to income 
would be 1.3 percent of income, compared to 1.7 percent for the European multinationals. 
This comparison ought to be treated with great caution, due to the quite different survey 
methodologies employed in the two studies. 
The third question in Table 6 concerns the effective tax rate on foreign-source income 
levied by the home country. The answer is zero for 37 percent of the respondents (pre- 
sumably including all of those headquartered in countries that operate a territorial tax sys- 
tem), and the average response is estimated to be 11.2 percent. The fmal two questions 
refer to what fraction of total compliance costs are devoted to tax planning. A majority 
of firms placed that answer between 1 and 25 percent. The distribution of responses to 
this answer is not markedly different for domestic-source versus foreign-source income. 
6. What tax changes would reduce compliance cost in a significant way? 
For policy purposes, as important as the level and determinants of compliance costs is the 
direction of promising reform to reduce those costs. Of course, minimal compliance costs 
is by no means the only, or even overriding, objective of a tax system. Nevertheless, we 
believe it is helpful to identify those aspects of the tax code that, according to corporate 
tax officers, would provide significant cost savings. 
This question was asked directly in both the OTPR and ITPF surveys. In the OTPR survey, 
the tax officers were asked, "What suggestions would you make to simplify compliance 
with the tax (system) at either the federal or state/local levels?" Answers were thus not 
limited to foreign-source income. 
Of those suggestions related to foreign-source income, simplification of the foreign tax 
credit was by far the most often recommended suggestion. Also cited specifically were 
the allocation-of-expense rules-- Form 5471 for reporting of controlled foreign corporation 
activity and Section 482 on transfer pricing. A few mentioned more radical proposals such 
as moving to a territorial system of taxation and eliminating deferral. The distribution of 
responses is detailed in Table 7. 
A question about desirable simplifications was also put directly to the ITPF member 
companies, specifically: "What, if any, specific revisions of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code 
would you suggest to reduce the cost of complying with U.S. rules regarding the taxation 
of foreign-source income?" They were asked to list up to three suggestions, and, for each 
suggestion, the respondent was asked to estimate the saving in the total compliance cost 
of foreign-source income from enacting these revisions. 
The twelve companies that responded to this question came up with twenty-nine sugges- 
tions. The specific revision mentioned most often (by six firms) was to measure the earn- 
ings and profits of foreign affiliates using book income for financial accounting purposes. 
50 MARSHA BLUMENTHAL AND JOEL B. SLEMROD 
Table 7. Foreign-source tax simplification most often suggested by corporate tax officers. 
Rank Reform Mentions 
1 Simplify foreign tax credit, including reducing number of baskets 13 
2 (tie) Simplify allocation rules 4 
2 ( t i e )  Eliminate or simplify Form 5471 4 
4 (tie) Allow safe havens for transfer policy 3 
4 ( t i e )  Eliminate deferral 3 
6 (tie) Simplify Subpart F 2 
6 ( t i e )  Eliminate pooling of dividends for calculating foreign tax credit 2 
Source: OTPR Survey. 
Rank Reform Mentions 
1 Use U.S. book income for accounting purposes to measure the earnings and 
profits of foreign affiliates 6 
Allow conversion of foreign taxes using annual exchange rate 4 
Simplify foreign tax credit baskets 3 
Simplify information reporting on foreign affiliates (Form 5471) 2 
Source: ITPF Survey. 
The average percentage saving estimated for these six companies was 2.5 percent. Other 
suggestions mentioned more  than once were to allow conversion of foreign taxes using an 
annual average exchange rate (four mentions); to eliminate or simplify (by reducing to only 
an active and passive basket) the foreign tax credit baskets (three mentions); and to simplify 
information reporting on foreign affiliates on Form 5471 (two mentions). 
Concern over the costs of  complexity, and suggestions for reducing it, have come recently 
not only from the business community. A prominent tax lawyer, David R. TiUinghast (199t), 
has remarked ruefully "that since 1962, at least, the Internal Revenue Code has been hope- 
lessly and often needlessly complicated in its application to international transactions--to 
the point where it is doubtful whether the law can be administered or, even given the desire 
to do so, complied with" (p. 190). He goes on to carefully evaluate the simplification poten- 
tial of both incremental and fundamental reforms of the U.S. system of taxing foreign-source 
income. We consider here only the simplification potential of  fundamental reform options. 
Tillinghast first considers the rules governing which foreign-source income is taxed on 
accrual and which income is eligible for deferral. He concludes that the most effective 
simplification would be a complete termination of deferral, although he notes that it would 
simplify "by giving the victory to the tax collector" (p. 195). Note, though, that given the 
current U.S. tax rate of  35 percent and the ability to average income of many kinds from 
many countries, the estimated revenue pickup from eliminating deferral may be quite small. 
Although considerable simplification could be achieved by taking the opposite route of  
unlimited deferral, because this is unlikely to be applied to passive investment rules to dis- 
tinguish passive and active income would have to be retained. 
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With regard to the relief of double taxation, Tillinghast asserts that the simplest system 
is one that is anathema to business on other grounds--the deduction system. Allowing tax- 
payers to deduct without limit foreign taxes as an expense rather than claiming a credit 
would eliminate the need to define foreign income taxes and the need to compute any limita- 
tion on the allowance and would allow simplification of provisions dealing with foreign 
losses. Deductibility combined with an elimination of deferral would render irrelevant the 
allocation of expenses between domestic and foreign income within a controlled group and 
would eliminate the incentive to generate low-taxed foreign income. 
Tillinghast rejects deductibility because of its adverse impact on foreign direct invest- 
ment and its international unacceptability, and goes on to consider other reform options. 
He considers a type of exemption system, under which passive income would be taxed 
on an accrual basis but active business income of foreign-source would be exempt from 
U.S. taxation. Tillinghast concludes that this system "would accomplish some, but not a 
remarkable amount of simplification" (p. 211). Although there would be no need for a 
foreign-tax-credit mechanism for active income, it would still be necessary to sort income 
into U.S. and foreign source and then into the exempt category and foreign tax credit cate- 
gory. Expenses would still have to be allocated and apportioned. 
A recent U.S. Treasury Department (1993) study also considered the simplification poten- 
tial of major reform options. It first considered what was called a "modified exemption" 
system. Under this system, active foreign-source business income subject to a substantial 
rate of foreign tax, or earned in a country that generally applies a substantial rate of tax, 
would be exempt from U.S. taxation; passive income and active income not subject to high 
enough foreign tax would be subject to U.S. tax, probably on a current basis, and allowed 
a foreign tax credit. The Treasury concluded that the simplification potential of a modified 
exemption system would depend on the manner in which it were implemented, in particular 
how precise was the method used in identifying exempt income. 
The Treasury also considered the elimination of deferral--that is, the taxation of all foreign- 
source income on a current basis. As with the modified exemption system, they concluded 
that the simplification potential depends largely on how exactly it is implemented. It would 
simplify compliance by eliminating the need to distinguish, as under current law, income 
eligible for deferral and income subject to current taxation. Additional complexity would 
depend on whether it was implemented by using the Subpart F method by giving foreign 
affiliates domestic corporation treatment or by using the branch method. 
7. Summary 
The main points of this investigation can be summarized as follows: 
1. The overall income tax compliance costs of large U.S. companies are substantial, aver- 
aging over $2 million annually for a Fortune 500 firms or $1.5 million for a typical 
business subject to the IRS large-case audit program. Relative to the revenues collected, 
however, these costs are smaller than individual income tax compliance costs--3.2 per- 
cent compared to 5 to 7 percent. 
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2. About 40 percent of the costs of complying with the federal income tax are due to foreign- 
source income. This figure exceeds the share of assets, sales, or employment abroad, 
suggesting that the foreign-source income compliance costs are disproportionately high 
relative to their role in the activities of the corporation. 
3. The compliance costs of foreign-source income may be extremely high relative to the 
revenue raised by the U.S. government on this income, However, to the extent that the 
system of taxing foreign-source income is meant to protect the tax base on domestic- 
source income, this ratio is not particularly meaningful. 
4. According to corporate tax officers, the most costly features of the U.S. system of taxing 
foreign-source income are the foreign tax credit and the information reporting on con- 
trolled foreign corporations. 
5. In contrast to the results reported here for U.S. multinationals, data from the Ruding 
Commission study suggest that, for European multinationals, compliance costs relative 
to income are no higher than they are for domestic operations. 
6. Two careful recent studies have concluded that fundamental reforms of the U.S. inter- 
national tax system could reduce compliance costs substantially, but how much savings 
could be achieved depends on the details of how these reforms are implemented. 
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No~s  
1. For the purposes of this paper, compliance cost refers simply to gross expenditures by firms on tax matters. 
To what extent compliance costs represent a burden to the firm, or a resource cost to the country, is discussed 
at length elsewhere (Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick, 1989). Certainly some portion of these costs, (such 
as those devoted to tax planning) is incurred voluntarily and likely yields a net positive return to the firm. 
These costs then do not represent a privately borne burden but do nevertheless constitute a burden on society, 
as the resources represented by the cost have alternative uses. Because the costs are tax-deductible, the net 
cost to the firm is lower than the gross figure presented here and the social cost. 
There are also social costs to tax complexity that are not included in our figures and are difficult to quan- 
tify. Complexity inevitably introduces a capriciousness of tax burdens and in particular may confer an advan- 
tage to firms whose corporate culture is open to exploiting opportunities for expected tax reduction. 
2. The survey methodology is described in detail in Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993). The OTPR survey, and 
the ITPF survey discussed later, are available upon request from the authors. 
3. This response rate is low enough that there is a potential for response bias. The following analysis makes 
no correction for this, except in the construction of a reweighted sample representing the Fortune 500. Even 
in this case, the reweighting is related to size and not to any other firm characteristic that may be correlated 
with the compliance costs of taxation. We do know, though, that the sectoral and asset-size distribution of 
the respondent population matches quite closely to the distribution of the CEP firms (see Slemrod and Blumen- 
thai, 1993). 
4. The survey was accompanied by a letter stating the objectives of the research--to construct a baseline estimate 
of the magnitude of costs of complying with the corporate income tax and to identify the determinants of 
these costs--and promising anonymity. 
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5. The reweighting procedure divided, by ranking, the Fortune 500 into ten groups of fifty firms; the weighting 
factors applied to each firm was fifty divided by the number of firms in the group of fifty in the respondent 
sample. 
6. This represents a slight increase in real costs compared to the estimates done for 1986 by Arlinghaus and 
Anderson (1986). 
7. In the cover letter accompanying the survey, respondents were asked to include the expenditures of foreign 
affiliates resulting from U.S. tax laws and to exclude expenditures incurred due to foreign tax laws. 
8. Note that the 39.2 percent does not represent an average of the reported percentages. Instead it is 100 times 
the ratio of total costs due to foreign source income to total overall costs. 
9. In all of the results reported in this section and thereafter, financial firms are excluded from analyses of assets 
and sales and included in analyses of employment. With the exception of Table 4 (which includes a dummy 
variable for the presence of a foreign parent), we also deleted from the sample all foreign-owned firms. Tables 
1 and 2 refer to all firms in the sample; eliminating foreign-owned firms increases the average compliance 
cost figures in these tables only slightly. 
10. To be precise, we estimated three ordinary least-squares regressions of the following form: y = aox + alx 2 + 
a2x 3, where a o + a I + a 2 was constrained to equal one. The regression results were as follows, with stan- 
dard errors in parentheses: 
PFC = 1.99 PFA - 3.20 PFA 2 + 2.21 PFA 3 R 2 = 0.346, n = 195 
(0.24) (0.91) (0.69) 
PFC = 2.33 PFS - 4.79 PFS 2 + 3.47 PFS 3 R 2 = 0.349, n = 189 
(0.21) (0.76) (0.56) 
PFC = 2.00 PFE - 3.64 PFE 2 + 2.64 PFE 3 R 2 = 0.378, n = 243 
(0.20) (0.73) (0.54) 
Note that, because the cubic is constrained to go through (0, 0), including these observations in the regres- 
sion analysis has no effect on the estimates. 
11. These averages in this section are obtained from the distributions presented in Devereux (1992) by assuming 
the average value of each range, 0.5 percent for the "less than 1 percent" category, 15 percent for the "over 
l0 percent" category, and 50 percent for the "over 35 percent" category. 
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